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Cases concerning the law of property and, in particular, trusts have had a significant impact 
upon the illegality defence throughout the common law. The decision of the House of Lords in 
Tinsley v Milligan1 acted as a catalyst for the prolonged work of the Law Commission; that 
was a trusts case, which built upon decisions concerning legal property rights.2 The ‘“eliance-
based’ approach endorsed in Tinsley clearly did cause some concern in trust cases,3 and in Patel 
v Mirza4 the departure from the reliance principle came as no great surprise. As a result, some 
cases concerning trusts may now be decided differently; indeed, the Supreme Court in Patel v 
Mirza expressed dissatisfaction with Collier v Collier,5 for example. Considering how the 
illegality defence will operate in the context of trusts is therefore of some practical importance.6 
However, the number of cases affected should not be exaggerated. In its ‘Impact Assessment 
for Reforming the Law of Illegality in Trusts’ in 2010, the Law Commission was only able to 
identify 19 reported cases in the previous 9 years.7 Even in its original consultation, the 
Commission recognised that:8  
 
[T]rusts which ‘involve’ illegality have not caused, and would perhaps be unlikely to 
cause, significant difficulties for the courts. There is certainly a dearth of case law 
dealing with many of the ways in which a trust may ‘involve’ a legal wrong. 
 
In any event, Patel v Mirza is not a trusts case, and the Supreme Court did not consider the 
ramifications that decision may have in this area of law. Lord Sumption warned that the 
majority’s stance could lead to ‘unforeseen and undesirable collateral consequences’,9 and 
these could be felt particularly keenly where property rights are concerned. Moreover, there 
are a number of open questions concerning the effect of illegality in the law of trusts, and this 
chapter will also seek to address the most pressing of these. 
 
I. Does Patel v Mirza affect the Law of Trusts? 
  
It may seem obvious that the decision of the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza affects all areas 
of private law, and is not limited to the facts of the dispute which was before the court. After 
all, Lord Toulson, speaking for the majority, was clear that the approach in Tinsley v Milligan 
                                           
1 Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340. 
2 See, in particular, Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd [1945] KB 65 (CA). 
3 See, eg, the comments of Judge Weeks QC at first instance and the Court of Appeal in Tribe v Tribe [1996] Ch 
107, 118 (Nourse LJ), 133 (Millett LJ); Q v Q [2008] EWHC 1874 (Fam), [2009] Fam Law 17 [138] (Black J). 
4 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467. 
5 Collier v Collier [2002] EWCA Civ 1095, [2002] BPIR 1057.  
6 Lord Sumption noted ‘the volume of litigation which the [illegality] principle has generated in every period of 
its history’: Patel (n 4) [263]. 
7 Law Commission, The Illegality Defence (Law Com No 320) 80. 
8 Law Commission, Illegal Transactions: The Effect of Illegality on Contracts and Trusts (Law Com CP No 154, 
1999) para 8.16. 
9 Patel (n 4) [226]; see too [165] (Lord Neuberger). 
 should be departed from.10 But while throughout the judgment reference was made to the law 
of contract, tort and unjust enrichment,11 there was little explicit discussion of property rights.12 
Given the facts of Patel v Mirza – which concerned the recovery of money paid under a contract 
tainted by illegality – this is understandable. But it does highlight the ambition of the majority 
in Patel v Mirza: effectively, the Supreme Court sought to reform a wide area of law, and used 
the dispute in one particular case as a springboard to do so. This is problematic, given the nature 
of how cases are decided.13 Counsel on both sides in Patel v Mirza were, inevitably, focussed 
on achieving the best outcome for their clients, for whom the coherence of the law is naturally 
secondary to winning the case. Indeed, it appears that neither side actually asked the Supreme 
Court to adopt an approach which balanced a ‘range of factors’ when deciding whether to apply 
the illegality defence, and that this step was taken of the Court’s own volition.14 It is impossible 
for the Supreme Court to have the same information and broad view available to it as a 
legislature would have, and it is not obviously desirable for judges to quasi-legislate in the 
manner undertaken by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza. It is worth recalling the wise 
warning of Lord Goff in Tinsley v Milligan:15  
 
[I]f there is to be a reform aimed at substituting a system of discretionary relief for the 
present rules, the reform is one which should only be instituted by the legislature, after 
a full inquiry into the matter by the Law Commission, such inquiry to embrace not only 
the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the present law, but also the likely 
advantages and disadvantages of a system of discretionary relief.  
 
 Nevertheless, it would now take a very bold judge to apply the approach in Tinsley v 
Milligan to a trust dispute on the basis that the ratio of Patel v Mirza does not cover trusts.16 
And it is at least understandable why the Supreme Court decided to ‘venture further’17 and deal 
with the law of illegality more broadly: the law was a mess, strongly criticised,18 and it was 
unlikely that a better opportunity would soon present itself to the Supreme Court to deal with 
the law concerning trusts.19 Before Patel v Mirza, lower court judges continued to feel 
constrained to apply Tinsley in the context of trusts.20 In order to move away from that situation, 
the majority Justices clearly intended that their favoured approach be applied broadly. 
 
                                           
10 See, eg, ibid [114]; see too, eg, [134] (Lord Kerr). 
11 See, eg, ibid [164], [174] (Lord Neuberger), [191], [204] (Lord Mance); [230], [263] (Lord Sumption). 
12 Although Lord Toulson did recognise that illegality ‘has the potential to provide a defence to civil claims of all 
sorts, whether relating to contract, property, tort or unjust enrichment’: ibid [2]. Cf R (Best) v Chief Land Registrar 
[2016] QB 23. 
13 Patel (n 4) [164] (Lord Neuberger). The Law Commission originally thought that ‘any possibility of wholesale 
judicial reform appears blocked’: CP 154 (n 8) para 5.10. 
14 Patel (n 4) [261] (Lord Sumption); cf [20] (Lord Toulson). 
15 Tinsley (n 1) 364. 
16 Writing before the decision in Patel v Mirza was handed down, one commentator considered there to ‘be some 
merit in a bifurcated approach in which the reliance test set out in Tinsley remained the appropriate test for “trust 
cases”’: C Darton, ‘’Trusts and the Law of Illegality’ (2016) 22 Trusts & Trustees 729, 736.   
17 Patel (n 4) [166] (Lord Neuberger). 
18 See, eg, the comments of Gloster LJ in the Court of Appeal in Patel v Mirza [2014] EWCA Civ 1047, [2015] 
Ch 271, cited by Lord Toulson in the Supreme Court in Patel (n 4) [15]. 
19 See, eg, Patel (n 4) [133] (Lord Kerr). 
20 See, eg, Hniazdzilau v Vajgel [2016] EWHC 15 (Ch). 
  This has the advantage of maintaining a semblance of coherency and consistency across 
private law: the law of property and trusts is not an entirely different species from contract and 
tort.21 Nevertheless, there appears to be some feeling that certainty is especially important in 
the context of property rights. The Law Commission was acutely conscious of many responses 
to its consultations which emphasised the need for certainty in the context of property rights,22 
and the Draft Bill it ultimately attached to its final report was very narrow in scope and covered 
only equitable property rights but not legal property rights. The reliance principle in 
Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd23 would therefore have been maintained. Admittedly, 
the Commission thought this was a source of ‘regret’, but the different considerations at issue 
– particularly as regards third parties – when considering property rights mean that it is unlikely 
that Patel v Mirza will be the final word on illegality in property law. Indeed, when 
downplaying fears of uncertainty, Lord Toulson pointed out that ‘people contemplating 
unlawful activity’ do not perhaps ‘deserve’ that the law be entirely certain;24 but where the 
claim in a trust dispute concerns third parties, such reasoning is obviously weakened. As Lord 
Neuberger rightly observed, innocent third parties are entitled to expect the law to be clear, and 
“there is a general public interest in certainty and clarity in all areas of law”.25 
 
II. The Role and Future of the Presumption of Advancement 
  
The decision in Tinsley highlighted the importance of the two so-called ‘presumptions’ of 
resulting trust and advancement. Equity is generally said to be suspicious of transfers made for 
no consideration in return, so a donee may hold the property transferred on trust for the donor 
by virtue of a ‘presumption of resulting trust’. In some circumstances, however, equity will 
presume that a gift was intended because of the relationship between the parties, as a result of 
a ‘presumption of advancement’. The effect of these different presumptions relates to the 
allocation of the burden of proof:26 where the presumption of resulting trust arises, the burden 
will be on the transferee to show that a trust was not intended, and where the presumption of 
advancement applies, the burden will be on the transferor to show that he or she did not intend 
a gift but intended to retain a beneficial interest in the property.  
 
In Stack v Dowden,27 Baroness Hale cited with approval the observation of Lord 
Diplock in Pettitt v Pettitt that the equitable presumptions are ‘no more than a consensus of 
judicial opinion disclosed by reported cases as to the most likely inference of fact to be drawn 
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary’.28 However, it is worth highlighting that the 
existence of two competing ‘presumptions’ is controversial. Logically, only one is needed. So, 
for example, we may only need a presumption of resulting trust, and where this does not apply 
                                           
21 F Rose, ‘Restitutionary and Proprietary Consequences of Illegality’ in F Rose (ed), Consensus Ad Idem: Essays 
on the Law of Contract in Honour of Guenter Treitel (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) 216. 
22 See, eg, CP 154 (n 8) paras 6.87–6.88; LC 320 (n 7) para 3.46. 
23 n 2. 
24 Patel (n 4) [113]; see too [137] (Lord Kerr). 
25 ibid [158]; see too, eg, [263] (Lord Sumption). 
26 Russell v Scott (1936) 55 CLR 440, 451 (Dixon and Evatt JJ). 
27 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 AC 432 [60]. 
28 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777 (HL) 823H. 
 there is no need for any fact to be presumed and therefore no need for any ‘presumption’ of 
advancement.29  
 
Nevertheless, the language of two different presumptions is entrenched in the decided 
cases and was raised to undue prominence by the House of Lords in Tinsley. Miss Tinsley and 
Miss Milligan were lovers who purchased a property which was conveyed into the sole name 
of Tinsley, even though Milligan had contributed to the purchase price. The purpose of this 
arrangement was to defraud the Department of Social Security. Milligan claimed a share in the 
property, and Tinsley argued that she could not do so because of her illegal conduct. A bare 
majority of the House of Lords held that Milligan could claim a share in the house despite the 
illegal purpose of the arrangement. Milligan could rely on the presumed resulting trust which 
arose in her favour by virtue of her contribution to the purchase price:30 she did not need to 
lead any evidence of illegality in order to establish her beneficial interest, and Tinsley could 
not rebut the presumption of resulting trust by relying on the illegal purpose of the arrangement. 
However, on only slightly different facts the result would have been entirely different. If the 
case had concerned a married heterosexual couple, and the husband had contributed to the 
purchase of a house in the sole name of his wife, then there would have been a presumption of 
advancement in favour of his wife, rather than a presumption of resulting trust. Consequently, 
the husband would not have been able to claim a share in the property: he would have needed 
to lead evidence of illegality in order to rebut the presumption of advancement, and this would 
not be permitted. Yet the merits of the two cases appear overwhelmingly similar. 
 
This highlights that the two presumptions ‘are not as innocuous as they seem’.31 The 
relationship between the parties could be crucial in determining whether a trust prima facie 
arises, and whether there is any need to rely upon illegal conduct. This was highlighted in Tribe 
v Tribe.32 A father transferred shares to his son to conceal them from his creditors. Once the 
threat from his creditors had passed, the father asked his son to return the shares to him. The 
son refused and argued that, since there had been an apparent gift from father to son, the 
presumption of advancement applied and the father was unable to rebut this by pleading his 
actual unlawful purpose. The Court of Appeal held that, since none of the creditors had been 
aware of the transfer of shares, no part of the illegal purpose had been carried into effect, so 
the father could withdraw from the illegal scheme as he was still within the ‘locus poenitentiae’; 
the father could therefore plead his illegal intent in order to rebut the presumption of 
advancement. This reliance on the locus poenitentiae is controversial, since it appears that the 
illegal purpose of the father had been carried out, as his shares were hidden with his son for a 
given period, exactly as intended.33 The decision in Tribe v Tribe seems to fall foul of the 
warning given by Lord Denning in Chettiar v Chettiar that ‘he cannot use the process of the 
                                           
29 W Swadling, ‘Legislating in Vain’ in A Burrows, D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: 
Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford, OUP, 2013). 
30 On the same facts today the analysis would be based upon a constructive trust rather than resulting trust, 
following the decisions in Stack v Dowden (n 27) and Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53, [2012] 1 AC 776: see 
below. 
31 JD Davies, ‘Presumptions and Illegality’ in AJ Oakley (ed), Trends in Contemporary Trust Law (Oxford, OUP, 
1996) 33. 
32 Tribe v Tribe [1996] Ch 107. 
33 F Rose, ‘Gratuitous transfers and illegal purposes’ (1996) 112 LQR 386. 
 courts to get the best of both worlds – to achieve his fraudulent purpose and also to get his 
property back’.34 
 
 Following Patel v Mirza it may now be that there is no need to invoke a locus 
poenitentiae since the balancing approach necessarily takes into account whether the illegal 
purpose has been fulfilled.35 But Tribe highlights a certain level of dissatisfaction with the rigid 
approach in Tinsley. Millett LJ criticised the ‘harshness’ of the decision in Tinsley,36 and 
Nourse LJ cited with apparent approval the criticism of HHJ Weekes QC at first instance in the 
case, who found it ‘difficult to see why the outcome in cases such as the present one should 
depend to such a large extent on arbitrary factors, such as whether the claim is brought by a 
father against a son, or a mother against a son, or a grandfather against a grandson’.37 More 
recently, Black J has lamented that ‘the courts have plainly felt uncomfortable at times with 
the results of the rules, which can seem sometimes to favour one of a number of parties who 
are all equally implicated in the illegal purpose simply by virtue of the accident of how a case 
has to be pleaded, but that is the way in which the law operates’.38 
 
 Much of the dissatisfaction stems from whether the presumption of advancement or 
presumption of resulting trust arises from the facts of the case. And it is in the context of illegal 
transactions that the presumptions are most important: both the presumption of advancement 
and the presumption of resulting trust can be displaced by any evidence of a contrary 
intention,39 but the major restriction was that evidence tainted by illegality was not admissible 
under the ‘reliance principle’ of Tinsley. As a result, the Law Commission understandably 
considered whether the presumption of advancement could simply be abolished,40 and whether 
this would solve many of the problems posed for the law of trusts by Tinsley. Although this 
proposal apparently received the support of consultees, this limited idea of reform was soon 
dropped by the Law Commission since it would only affect resulting trusts. Yet the fact-pattern 
of Tinsley itself would no longer be considered to concern a resulting trust, but rather a 
constructive trust, following the decisions of the House of Lords in Stack v Dowden41 and Jones 
v Kernott.42  
 
 Beyond the context of illegality, the presumption of advancement has continued to be 
attacked. In its traditional form, it is easy to criticise this presumption as anachronistic and 
discriminatory. In Tinsley v Milligan, Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained that it applied to ‘a 
transfer from a man to his wife, children or others to whom he stands in loco parentis’.43 But 
why should it matter whether the transferor was male or female? The basis of the presumption 
appears to be that women and children depended upon a patriarch such that the advantage of a 
presumption of advancement was required as a matter of public policy. However, as Lord Reid 
                                           
34 Chettiar v Chettiar [1962] AC 294, 302. 
35 See, eg, Patel (n 4) [44], [116] (Lord Toulson); see too [169] (Lord Neuberger) and cf, eg, [202] (Lord Mance), 
[247]–[253] (Lord Sumption). 
36 Tribe (n 32) 133. 
37 Ibid 118. 
38 Q v Q [2008] EWHC 1874 (Fam), [2009] Fam Law 17 [138]. 
39 See, eg Pettit (n 28) 814 (Lord Upjohn). 
40 See http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Presumption_of_Advancement.pdf 
41 n 27.  
42 n 30. 
43 Tinsley (n 1) 372. 
 commented in Pettitt v Pettitt as long ago as 1969, ‘These considerations have largely lost their 
force under present conditions, and, unless the law has lost all flexibility so that the courts can 
no longer adapt it to changing conditions, the strength of the presumption must have been much 
diminished’.44 It has also been said that existence of the presumption of advancement is 
contrary to human rights,45 although the better view is that the presumption of advancement in 
itself is probably not contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.46  
 
 In any event, distinguishing between gifts on the basis that they were made by a man 
or by a woman is clearly unsatisfactory. There are two principal options for future reform: 
either abolish the presumption of advancement, or extend it so that it also applies to transfers 
from wife to husband and mother to child, for example. The first option was adopted in section 
199 of the Equality Act 2010. Yet despite much of the Equality Act 2010 already being 
implemented, section 199 has not been brought into force, and there are no indications that the 
Government intends to do so. It is suggested that one consequence of Patel v Mirza will be that 
section 199 of the Equality Act 2010 is even less likely to be implemented, since any perceived 
need to do so will be reduced now that cases on illegality no longer turn upon whether the 
presumption of advancement applies.  
 
 Judicial proclamations that the presumption of advancement is on its ‘death-bed’47 are 
therefore likely to prove premature. More to the point is Lord Neuberger’s observation in Stack 
v Dowden that ‘the presumption of advancement, as between man and wife, which was so 
important in the 18th and 19th centuries, has now become much weakened, although not quite 
to the point of disappearance’.48 Indeed, it is possible to imagine that the presumption might 
conceivably have some role to play beyond illegal transactions. For instance, a father might 
transfer property to his son immediately before becoming mentally incapacitated or dying, and 
it may be important to ascertain where the burden of proof lies. It is suggested that there is 
much to be said in favour of retaining the presumption of advancement. After all, when a father 
gives property to his child, it seems more likely than not that a gift was intended, and that the 
burden should be on the father to prove the contrary. It is to be hoped that the presumption will 
simply be extended to cover gifts from mother to child49 and from wife to husband50 or between 
spouses in a same-sex marriage. This path is available to judges when developing the common 
law. It is doubtful whether the contrary approach of abolishing the presumption of advancement 
                                           
44 Pettitt (n 39) 793. 
45 See, eg, G Andrews, ‘The Presumption of Advancement: Equity, Equality and Human Rights’ [2007] Conv 
340, who considers the presumption to be inconsistent with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex, as well as Article 5 of Protocol 7 of the Convention, 
which provides that ‘Spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of a private law character between 
them, and in their relations with their children, as to marriage, during marriage and in the event of its dissolution.’ 
46 J Glister, ‘Section 199 of the Equality Act 2010: How Not to Abolish the Presumption of Advancement’ (2010) 
73 MLR 807, who argues that Article 5 of Protocol 7 is limited to relations between spouses and their children in 
the context of marriage, and that the presumption of advancement is not a ‘right’ within the scope of Article 5. 
The United Kingdom has not (yet) ratified Protocol 7. 
47 Bhura v Bhura [2014] EWHC 727 (Fam), [2015] 1 FLR 153 [8] (Mostyn J); see too Jones v Kernott (n 30) [34] 
(Lord Walker and Lady Hale). 
48 Stack v Dowden (n 27) [101]. 
49 See the approach of the Australian courts in Nelson v Nelson [1995] HCA 25, (1995) 184 CLR 538. 
50 Cf Abrahams v Trustee in Bankrputcy of Abrahams (1999) 31 LS Gaz R 38, [1999] BPIR 637. 
 should be pursued by judges when Government has deliberately chosen not to bring such a 
reform into effect through section 199. 
  
There is some evidence that the courts have already started to shift in the direction of 
expanding the presumption of advancement. In Antoni v Antoni, Lord Scott, giving the advice 
of the Privy Council, employed gender-neutral language in describing the presumption of 
advancement as applying ‘when a parent places assets in the name of a child and assumes that 
the parent intends to make a gift to the child’.51 Similarly, in Close Invoice Finance Ltd v 
Abaowa, Mr Simon Picken QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge, said, obiter, that he ‘would have had 
no hesitation in deciding that in the modern age the presumption of advancement should, 
indeed, be taken as applying between a mother and a daughter in the same way that it does as 
between a father and his child’.52 It has been suggested this approach might come at an indirect 
cost to women,53 and it may prove difficult to define precisely which relationships give rise to 
the presumption of advancement. Nevertheless, it remains the best avenue available to judges. 
The alternative option of abolishing the presumption can now only satisfactorily be achieved 
through legislation, and in many respects section 199 remains problematic. For example, that 
provision would operate prospectively only;54 reform should be both immediate and have 
retrospective effect.  
  
III. Implementing the work of the Law Commission? 
  
It is clear that Lord Toulson and the majority of the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza were 
influenced by the work of the Law Commission.55 Given that Lord Toulson was the Chair of 
the Commission for part of the very long lifetime of the Law Commission’s project, this is 
unsurprising. However, it is worth reflecting on the scope of the Law Commission’s proposals 
compared to the scope of the decision of the Supreme Court. This is particularly appropriate in 
the context of trusts, since the Law Commission did recommend statutory reform, and indeed 
the final report of the Law Commission included a Draft Trusts (Concealment of Interests) Bill 
(Draft Bill). 
  
Too much weight should not be placed upon the Law Commission’s proposed 
legislation. After all, the Government said that it was ‘minded not to implement the 
Commission’s proposals’,56 and the Law Commission itself confessed to finding the project 
very difficult, and to divisions within the Commission.57 It might be thought that the Law 
Commission did well just to rid itself of the project in the end, since, at least on one view, it 
had received something of a ‘hospital pass’ from Lord Goff in being made to look at such an 
intricate and complex area of law where opinions differ markedly and vociferously. It is not 
surprising that legislation has not been passed. But the Law Commission’s project does have 
the great merit of clearly highlighting the major areas of difficulty in the common law, and it 
                                           
51 Antoni v Antoni [2007] UKPC 10, [2007] WTLR 1335. 
52 Close Invoice Finance Ltd v Abaowa [2010] EWHC 1920 (QB) [93]–[94]. 
53 See, eg, L Sarmas, ‘A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Emergence of Gender Neutrality in the Equitable 
Presumption of Advancement’ (1993) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 758. 
54 Equality Act, s 199(2). 
55 See, eg, Patel (n 4), [21]–[49] (Lord Toulson). 
56 Ministry of Justice, Report on the implementation of Law Commission Proposals (March 2012) [52].  
57 See, eg, CP 154 (n 8) para 1.3; LC 320 (n 7) para 1.6.  
 is interesting to consider to what extent the Supreme Court has resolved those difficulties, and 
how such problems might be confronted in the future. 
 
 The Draft Bill was only intended to apply ‘if in the court’s opinion the circumstances 
are exceptional’.58 It is unclear what the terms ‘exceptional’ and ‘circumstances’ mean. The 
Law Commission thought that what constitutes ‘exceptional circumstances’ can be ‘safely left 
to the courts’,59 but that this extra hurdle of exceptional circumstances was necessary since ‘in 
the general “run of the mill” type of case we do not expect the illegality to have any effect on 
the beneficiary’s entitlement’.60 However, if a beneficiary has taken steps to conceal an 
equitable interest for the purpose of committing a criminal offence – the only sort of situation 
to which the Draft Bill applies – this does not appear to be very ‘run of the mill’ at all. The 
Explanatory Notes to the Draft Bill indicate ‘that the circumstances might be exceptional 
where, for example, the claimant’s behaviour has been particularly reprehensible’,61 but this 
does not much further the quest for clarity. 
 
 The Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza did not endorse this ‘gateway’ of ‘exceptionality’. 
This has the advantage of avoiding prolonged discussion about whether the facts of a particular 
case fall within the scope of a statutory regime. However, it is also clear from the decision in 
Patel v Mirza that it is only in a rare case that the illegality defence will affect the result in a 
case.62 So although there is no formal barrier of ‘exceptionality’ to applying the balancing 
approach in Patel v Mirza, it is likely that it is only in situations where the illegality is very 
serious that a beneficiary would be unable to enforce his or her interests under a trust. 
 
 The Draft Bill, as its name suggests, was only intended to apply to instances of 
concealment.63 If a trust was set up in order to conceal a beneficiary’s interest in the property, 
and this was done in connection with the commission of an offence, then the statutory scheme 
would bite.64 The proposed legislation also covered situations where a trust was established for 
proper purposes, but was later deliberately continued in order to conceal a beneficial interest 
in connection with the commission of an offence, and this was exploited by one of the parties.65 
  
The decision in Patel v Mirza covers such situations. However, that decision is not as 
limited as the proposed statutory discretion. For example, cases where the trust is executed in 
return for consideration which is illegal,66 or where the relevant illegality is the source of the 
trust property, rather than the purpose of the trust arrangement,67 would have remained outside 
                                           
58 Draft Bill, cl 4(1). 
59 LC 320 (n 7) para 2.60. 
60 ibid. 
61 Draft Bill, B.31. 
62 This seems to follow from the result in Patel v Mirza itself, which departs from the approach in Parkinson v 
College of Ambulance Ltd [1925] 2 KB 1 (CA), considered below, text to nn 151-155.Lord Toulson recognised 
that in some extreme cases illegality may prevent the court from offering assistance, and gave the example of drug 
trafficking as an example of sufficiently serious illegality: Patel (n 4), [110] 
63 Draft Bill, cl 2. 
64 ibid cl 2(2). 
65 bid cl 2(4). 
66 Ayers v Jenkins (1873) LR 16 Eq 275 (CA). This is particularly significant since property rights can pass under 
an illegal contract: Singh v Ali [1960] AC 167. 
67 Compare Macdonald v Myerson [2001] EWCA Civ 66, [2001] EGCS 15 with Halley v Law Society [2003] 
EWCA Civ 97, [2003] WTLR 845. See too Mortgage Express v McDonnell [2001] EWCA Civ 887. 
 the scope of the statutory regime, but appear to be subject to the “new” approach to illegal 
transactions endorsed by the Supreme Court. This might be especially welcome in cases where 
the relevant illegality is particularly serious. 
 
 Indeed, the Law Commission’s very restrictive statutory regime would have left many 
property law cases outside its favoured approach, and created a divide between legal property 
rights and equitable property rights.68 That this unfortunate consequence has been avoided is 
most welcome.69 Moreover, the judicial approach promoted in Patel v Mirza can clearly be 
trumped by legislation which already provides that a transaction should be void, in which case 
there should be no balancing of factors at all.70 And if the trust requires a beneficiary to commit 
an unlawful act, for example, then the trust should also still be void.71 In any event, general 
principles of severance may still apply, such that an illegal and void provision may be severed 
from the other terms of the trust, such that the remainder of the trust can be enforced in the 
usual way.72 
 
IV. Illegality and Third Parties 
  
The Law Commission struggled to be clear about what the effect of illegality should be upon 
third parties to the trust. There are two main areas to consider here. First, what about claimants 
who are not the tainted beneficiaries, but instead the beneficiaries’ creditors73 or executors,74 
for example? And secondly, what about the position of third parties who are the innocent 
victims of the illegality?  
 
 As regards the first scenario, the Law Commission accepted that ‘the position is simply 
not clear’.75 In Collier v Collier, Mance LJ thought that the illegality defence might only bar 
the claim of a person tainted by the illegality, rather than an innocent creditor.76 In a case such 
as Collier, where both the ‘primary’ parties to the trust were similarly tainted by the illegality, 
allowing a claim brought by an innocent third party creditor would seem to lead to the most 
sensible results. On the other hand, in Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens77 the House of Lords 
appeared to take the view that the creditor could be in no better position than the beneficiary 
through whom he claimed. This is understandable, but the status of Moore Stephens has been 
somewhat undermined by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Bilta (UK) Ltd v 
Nazir that Moore Stephens should no longer be relied upon.78 Moreover, Moore Stephens might 
in any event be limited to cases brought on the basis of a breach of contractual or tortious duty 
of care. The more flexible approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza, and the 
desire to reach more transparently just outcomes, might suggest that the claims of an innocent 
                                           
68 The Law Commission confessed to being ‘disappointed’ by this: CP 154 (n 8) para 5.26.  
69 See, eg, Patel (n 4) [152] (Lord Neuberger), supporting Tinsley (n 1) 371 (Lord Browne Wilkinson). 
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 creditor or executor should trump the claims of a defendant tainted by illegality. Indeed, given 
the support extended to Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s view in Tinsley that the effect of illegality 
is procedural rather than substantive,79 it seems possible for a court to say that whilst a 
beneficiary cannot personally enforce his or her rights due to the illegality defence, creditors 
or executors suing through the beneficiary may be able to.  
 
This issue remains confused but important. It is to be hoped that guidance will soon be 
forthcoming. The Law Commission’s Draft Bill explicitly provided that one factor to be taken 
into account should be that the intended ‘victim’ of the concealment may have an interest in 
the value of the assets of the beneficiary.80 The Law Commission gave the example of a 
husband who may transfer property to his mistress in order to hide it from his wife. If a dispute 
were to arise between the husband and mistress over the ownership of the property, the court 
might take into account the possibility that the wife might in the future bring a claim against 
her husband under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and that the value of the wife’s possible 
claim might be reduced if the court were to decide that the husband did not in fact have an 
interest under a trust in the property transferred to the mistress because of the illegality defence. 
This is a sensible approach, and it is to be hoped that it will be adopted by the courts. 
 
 As regards third party victims of the illegality, the Supreme Court refused to recognise 
any power in the courts to force a party to give up his or her illegal gains to the third party. 
That might have serious repercussions in a case such as Tinsley v Milligan. On the facts of that 
case, it appears that Milligan may have made peace with the Department for Social Security by 
paying back the benefits she fraudulently claimed.81 But if she had not done so, and her claim 
were still not barred by the illegality defence due to the illegality being considered 
insufficiently serious,82 then she would be able to retain the benefits she had fraudulently 
claimed. This would represent a windfall benefit (which would not be shared with Tinsley). 
Rather than allowing Milligan to assert her share in the property and retain the fraudulently 
claimed benefits, it may be preferable to allow Milligan to assert her share in the property only 
if she returned the benefits fraudulently claimed. That would be an available course of conduct 
in Australia following the decision of the High Court in Nelson v Nelson,83 but this was 
described as a ‘yet further novelty’,84 and the door was shut on this possibility in Patel v 
Mirza.85  
 
 It is understandable why a court might feel uncomfortable arrogating to itself such an 
extensive power to make an order in favour of a third party not before the court. Indeed, the 
Law Commission also ultimately concluded that such a power would not be appropriate; after 
all, third party victims may choose to bring a claim in their own right,86 and whether they do 
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 so or not is up to them and should not trouble a separate dispute before a court.87 Yet the thrust 
of much of the reasoning in Patel v Mirza is to allow the courts to put the parties back into their 
original position before any illegality.88 If this is taken seriously, and followed through to its 
logical conclusion, then illegally acquired benefits should be given up to innocent parties who 
have been deprived by the illegal conduct. 
 
 In many instances, the third party which might have standing to bring the claim will be 
the State. Indeed, it might be thought that an illegal act necessarily involves a wrong against 
the State.89 In some circumstances, the State might seek to confiscate the proceeds of crime 
through the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This legislative regime was understandably not 
considered by the Supreme Court, and there were no submissions made regarding it.90 But why 
did the State not seek to confiscate the benefits illegally acquired in Patel v Mirza? The answer 
appears to have been previously recognised by the Law Commission: the National Crime 
Agency ‘does not have sufficient resources to institute proceedings in every case in which 
property has been obtained through unlawful conduct’.91 Admittedly, in the context of trust 
disputes the National Crime Agency’s interest may often be piqued given the possibility of 
recovering tangible assets and sizeable sums, but it cannot be said with confidence that Lord 
Sumption was right to surmise that confiscation would be inevitable even as regards ‘heinous 
crimes’.92 The priorities and resources of the National Crime Agency determine whether a 
confiscation order is sought. It is suggested that the power of the courts to confiscate illegally 
acquired gains should be expanded. This is best achieved through statutory reform, given the 
limits already imposed by Parliament through the 2002 Act;93 the reluctance of the Supreme 
Court squarely to confront this issue is therefore understandable.94  
 
Significantly, however, the Law Commission’s Draft Bill contained provision for some 
minor amendments to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in order to ensure that even where the 
court decides that the beneficiary should not be able to enforce his or her rights, there should 
be no adverse impact on the ability to recover the proceeds of crime.95 One limitation of 
reforming the law through judicial decisions is the inability to tinker with other statutes. Yet 
the Law Commission’s approach must be correct, and it is to be hoped that the courts somehow 
manage to arrive at the same outcome.96 It is unclear how this can best be achieved.97 There is, 
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 after all, no guarantee that the claim for confiscation will be pursued before the trust dispute 
between the parties tainted by illegality, and a court cannot simply refuse to decide the latter 
issue or wait for any potential confiscation issue to be resolved. Perhaps the courts need to 
develop a novel order themselves, whereby, for example, the beneficiary is held to be unable 
to enforce his or her interest as a result of the illegality, but that interest can still be confiscated 
by the National Crime Agency. 
 
V. The Consequences of Illegality 
  
Given that Patel v Mirza is not a trusts case, it is unsurprising that the decision of the Supreme 
Court does not resolve what the consequences of an illegal transaction in the trust context might 
be. The general thrust of the reasoning in Patel might suggest that if a trust fails for illegality 
then the settlor should be able to claim the return of his or her property under a resulting trust.98 
This is likely to be sufficient in many cases,99 but not in every situation. For instance, the 
settlor’s illegality may be so serious that the court is sensibly reluctant to allow the settlor to 
recover the property.100  
 
 As suggested above, in many circumstances the most attractive solution may be to 
confiscate the property which is the subject of the illegal transaction. Both the Law 
Commission and the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza considered that the civil courts should 
not effectively ‘punish’ parties in this way,101 unless authorised to do so under the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002.102 It may nonetheless be possible for judges in some trust cases to achieve the 
same result by declaring that the property is bona vacantia such that it reverts to the State, but 
this remains an unlikely outcome: it is tantamount to confiscation, and property which has had 
an owner should not readily become ownerless. 
 
 In general, therefore, the court has four options when deciding who is entitled to the 
equitable interest, all of which were recognised in the Law Commission’s Draft Bill: (i) the 
beneficiary;103 (ii) the trustee;104 (iii) the settlor;105 or (iv) another beneficiary under the same 
trust.106 The Law Commission concluded that these options were mutually exclusive, and that 
the illegality defence should operate in an all-or-nothing manner.107 This is consistent with a 
traditional approach to the doctrine, but it is interesting to speculate whether the more flexible 
approach favoured in Patel v Mirza might have an impact upon the remedies awarded as well. 
It may be that an all-or-nothing approach is too inflexible, just as the reliance principle in 
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 Tinsley has been recognised as too inflexible, and that in some instances the court might have 
a discretion to split property between the settlor and beneficiary.108 
 
If the settlor has transferred property to be held on trust for him, but the illegal 
purposes(such as terrorism) are so severe that the illegality defence applies and prevents the 
settlor from recovering his property, then it is difficult to know what should happen to the 
property. The Law Commission thought that in such situations the court might declare that 
the trustee, as legal owner, should become beneficially entitled to the property in question.109 
The Law Commission considered that this ‘would appear to require a new statutory power to 
be given to the court’,110 and would be an available option for a court even where the 
purported ‘trustee’ did not counterclaim for any relief in his or her favour. It is unclear 
whether such a solution is desirable: after all, why should the trustee reap such a windfall 
gain, and why would this be better than confiscation of the illegal gains to the State? It may 
be that this option will now fade away if the view that it can only be made possible through 
legislation is supported, although it should be noted that in Q v Q there is perhaps some 
suggestion that this result can be reached even in the absence of legislation.111 Similar 
concerns regarding undue windfalls surround the Law Commission’s suggestion that the 
courts should be able to award the settlor’s beneficial interest to ‘any other beneficiary’. This 
looks like confiscating property and transferring it to a third party, and courts may reasonably 
be slow to do this without being empowered to do so by statute.  
 
 It also remains to be seen how the relationship between illegality and sham will be 
resolved in the trusts context. This is a difficult topic. Sham trusts are often established in order 
to effect an illegal purpose. Under the Draft Bill, the Law Commission’s proposed scheme 
would have trumped any considerations of sham, and it may be that the more flexible approach 
favoured in Patel v Mirza will take priority over a more rigid approach towards sham trusts, 
especially as regards the relief available. Indeed, the consequence of finding that a trust is a 
sham appears to be that the trust is void;112 a more nuanced approach to illegal transactions 
might be preferred.  
 
 It should perhaps also be noted that courts may need to clarify the position of a trustee 
of an ‘illegal trust’ who administers the trust as if it was valid, only later to find that the trust 
is invalid under the broader approach favoured by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza. In 
principle, the trustee is likely to have committed a breach of trust. In appropriate cases it is to 
be expected that the trustee will be able to rely upon section 61 of the Trustee Act 1925 to be 
relieved from personal liability,113 but guidance regarding when the trustee should be expected 
to seek the directions of the court would be helpful. It is suggested that it is only in instances 
of serious and obvious illegality that a court should refrain from granting relief under section 
61 on the basis that the trustee ought to have sought the directions of the court. Similarly general 
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 principles should govern the liability of third parties who receive property conveyed to them 
by a trustee before a court decides that the trust is invalid for illegality: such third parties might 
be liable for knowing receipt114 or subject to a proprietary claim for the property received.115 
 
VI. Deciding Cases Differently 
  
The approach of courts to problems of illegality will be very different under the guidance of 
Patel v Mirza than it has previously been under Tinsley v Milligan. However, the Law 
Commission noted that any earlier difficulties did not generally result in unsatisfactory 
outcomes on the facts of individual cases, and the criticism was focussed upon the way that 
those decisions were reached.116 It can confidently be expected that many cases would be 
decided in exactly the same way even after Patel v Mirza. Indeed, in Patel v Mirza itself the 
divide between the judges as to the correct method of reasoning did not lead to any divergence 
in the outcome of the dispute. 
 
 In any event, the approach in Patel v Mirza is a clear break from earlier orthodoxy, and 
this appears to have been accepted by all members of the Supreme Court. In Tinsley v Milligan, 
Lord Goff noted that the traditional authorities left ‘no room for the exercise of any discretion 
by the court in favour of one party or the other’.117 The Court of Appeal in Tinsley v Milligan 
had employed a test of whether it would be ‘an affront to the public conscience’ to grant 
relief,118 but Lord Goff held that that ‘is little different, if at all, from stating that the court has 
a discretion whether to grant or refuse relief. It is very difficult to reconcile such a test with the 
principle of policy stated by Lord Mansfield CJ in Holman v Johnson … or with the established 
principles’ going back over 200 years.119  
 
 The majority approach in Patel v Mirza breaks away from the strictures of Tinsley v 
Milligan, and requires the balancing of a number of considerations. Lord Toulson concluded 
that ‘The law should strive for the most desirable policy outcome, and it may be that it is best 
achieved by taking into account a range of factors’.120 The crucial passage of Lord Toulson’s 
judgment is worth setting out in full:121 
 
I would say that one cannot judge whether allowing a claim which is in some way 
tainted by illegality would be contrary to the public interest, because it would be 
harmful to the integrity of the legal system, without a) considering the underlying 
purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed, b) considering conversely any 
other relevant public policies which may be rendered ineffective or less effective by 
denial of the claim, and c) keeping in mind the possibility of overkill unless the law is 
applied with a due sense of proportionality. We are, after all, in the area of public policy. 
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This balancing approach is influenced by the work of the Law Commission. However, 
the Law Commission’s Draft Bill set out a rather fuller list of factors to consider:122 
 
 (a) the conduct of all the relevant persons; 
(b) the effect which the declaration or determination would have on any relevant 
unlawful act or purpose; 
(c) the fact that an offence has, or has not, been committed; 
(d) the value of the relevant equitable interest; 
(e) any deterrent effect on others; 
(f) the possibility that a person from whom the relevant equitable interest was to be 
concealed might have an interest in the value of B’s [the beneficiary’s] assets (for 
example, as a creditor of B or because of proceedings under the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 or the Civil Partnership Act 2004). 
 
The Draft Bill also provided that ‘the court may take anything which it thinks relevant into 
account’;123 the above list of factors was optional and non-exhaustive. It is likely that all these 
factors will influence a court’s decision; Lord Toulson explicitly recognised the importance of 
the ‘seriousness of the conduct, its centrality to the contract, whether it was intentional and 
whether there was marked disparity in the parties’ respective culpability’.124 A similar list of 
relevant factors has been put forward by Andrew Burrows,125 and was described by Lord 
Toulson as ‘helpful’,126 but the Supreme Court ultimately baulked at setting down a list of 
potentially relevant factors.127 
  
Given the wide range of circumstances in which illegality might be an issue, and the 
numerous factors that might influence a court, it is understandable why the Supreme Court was 
wary about setting out a definitive list. The Law Commission also concluded that a 
comprehensive list was not feasible. Nevertheless, it is suggested that structured guidance is 
helpful. It allows parties to predict how a court will approach a dispute with greater confidence. 
Ultimately, despite their protestations to the contrary,128 the majority approach in Patel v Mirza 
vests judges with a discretion in determining the consequences of illegality.129 As Lord Clarke 
pointed out, the majority of the Supreme Court has effectively come ‘close to reviving the 
public conscience test’.130 It is ironic that after more than twenty years of grappling with this 
issue of illegality in the wake of the House of Lords decision in Tinsley, the Supreme Court 
has now reversed that decision and more or less restored the decision of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 In practice, the courts now have a discretion where illegality is concerned.131 This might 
make the reasoning of judges more transparent, such that the law becomes clear through the 
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 decided cases. Furthermore, a discretionary approach might reduce the number of appeals 
concerning the defence of illegality: unless a judge has taken into account irrelevant factors, or 
failed to take into account clearly relevant factors, then it should be very difficult to appeal on 
the basis that the judge weighed those factors incorrectly. A trial judge who has heard all the 
evidence is in the best position to exercise a discretion in this area. Of course, some judges may 
feel somewhat uncomfortable to be cast adrift in a sea of broad discretion; some judges prefer 
to apply clear rules, and that partly explains why Lord Goff in Tinsley thought that if judges 
were to be granted a discretionary power, that should receive the imprimatur of democratic 
legitimacy through an act of parliament. But the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza was far bolder 
than the House of Lords in Tinsley, and the judges arrogated to themselves a wide-ranging 
discretion. Perhaps trial judges might now feel emboldened when writing their judgments, 
especially given the diminished prospects of appeals. 
 
 So which cases would now have a different outcome? It seems clear from the judgments 
in the Supreme Court that the results in the key cases on resulting trust – Tinsley v Milligan 
and Tribe v Tribe – would be the same. The judges in Patel v Mirza thought that any other 
result in Tinsley v Milligan would be ‘disproportionate’.132 This is unsurprising. Indeed, 
although Lord Goff dissented in Tinsley, he did ‘not disguise [his] own unhappiness’ at doing 
so133 since denying Miss Milligan any interest in the property was ‘particularly harsh’.134 
Unwinding the transaction in Tribe v Tribe would still occur following Patel v Mirza, even if 
some of the illegal purpose had in fact been performed.135 It is interesting to note that these 
cases of intentional fraud do not seem to be treated as involving illegal conduct of a particularly 
serious nature,136 even though conspiracy to defraud may be punished with a custodial sentence 
of up to ten years.  
 
A difficult case is Collier v Collier.137 The Law Commission observed that ‘The facts 
of the case were complex and hard to discern, the judge concluding that both parties had lied 
to the court’.138 Essentially, a father, who owned the freehold to two properties, gave his 
daughter a lease over both premises, together with an option to purchase the freehold at a later 
date. The purpose of this transaction was to deceive the father’s creditors and the Inland 
Revenue; the father intended to continue to control both properties. Aldous and Chadwick LJJ 
held that the grant of the leases had not been by way of gift, because of the requirement that 
the daughter pay rent and a sum of money to exercise the option, so the presumption of 
advancement did not apply. Mance LJ, on the other hand, thought that the leases were shams 
and the presumption of advancement did apply. All three judges agreed that, if the presumption 
of advancement did apply, then it could not be rebutted by the father because of Tinsley v 
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 Milligan. That reasoning would no longer be followed, and it seems likely that if the transfer 
had been gratuitous then the father would now be able to establish a beneficial interest under a 
resulting trust, especially given the attitude of the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza towards 
Tribe v Tribe. 
 
The father also argued that there was an express trust in his favour. Chadwick LJ 
rejected this claim due to a lack of evidence; Aldous LJ held that any agreement included illegal 
terms and so could not be relied upon; Mance LJ thought that the father would have to rely on 
the proof of the purpose of their agreement, which was not allowed. Yet had the father been 
able to produce a simple document recording the express trust, then this would have been 
sufficient to establish a trust without leading any evidence of illegality. It is clearly 
unsatisfactory for the outcome of cases to depend upon whether an ‘untainted’ document can 
be produced as an ‘objective fact’, and the distinction drawn between relying upon an 
agreement and relying upon a neutral fact seems to be very fine indeed. The outcome of the 
case is, prima facie, that the daughter is rewarded for her duplicitous behaviour.139 As the Law 
Commission noted, ‘it seems nonsensical that the courts might decide the outcome of the case 
by looking at selective pieces of the relevant evidence’.140 Happily, Patel v Mirza suggests a 
different outcome would now be reached.141 The court would take into account the purpose of 
the prohibition and a sense of proportionality, such that the father would now be able to claim 
an interest under a trust.  
 
Patel v Mirza will also affect the law concerning constructive trusts, or at least common 
intention constructive trusts. In Tinsley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson thought that the same result 
should be reached regardless of whether the claim is brought for a beneficial interest under a 
resulting trust or under a common intention constructive trust.142 This view received some 
support from the Court of Appeal143 prior to Patel v Mirza, but in some situations it would have 
been difficult to establish any agreement sufficient for a ‘common intention’ without leading 
evidence of illegality.144 Following Patel v Mirza, such a formalistic approach is not required: 
courts can look at all the evidence and decide whether a party should be prevented from 
enforcing a beneficial interest due to the illegality.145 It is now even less likely that a party will 
be unable to claim a beneficial interest under a common intention constructive trust because of 
an illegal transaction. 
 
In any event, where the trust is created for an ‘illegal consideration’, it would appear 
that the trust is valid, not void, unless independently void because contrary to public policy.146 
Under the approach in Tinsley, it seemed likely that any beneficiary would be able to enforce 
the trust unless he or she needed to lead evidence of the illegality in order to establish his or 
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 her claim.147 However, the better view may now be that the trust is enforceable by an innocent 
beneficiary, but not by a party who provided the illegal consideration and knew that it was 
illegal, although admittedly this may be the subject of a balancing approach.148 
 
Finally, it is worth considering whether Patel v Mirza will have any impact in situations 
where a fiduciary receives a bribe to commit a breach of fiduciary duty, and receiving (and 
giving) the bribe constitutes a crime.149 In FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital 
Partners LLC,150 the Supreme Court held that the fiduciary holds the bribe on constructive trust 
for his or her principal. This is sometimes justified by a perceived need to prevent the fiduciary 
from obtaining a windfall profit. That seemed particularly important since Parkinson v College 
of Ambulance Ltd151 was understood to mean that the briber cannot recover the value of the 
bribe from the fiduciary. However, in Patel v Mirza the Supreme Court signalled dissatisfaction 
with Parkinson v College of Ambulance Ltd and thought it was wrongly decided.152 This is 
somewhat surprising, and is analysed in detail elsewhere.153 It may perhaps be that the strength 
of the Supreme Court’s commitment to restitutio in integrum and unwinding illegal 
transactions means that the briber should be able to recover the value of the bribe from the 
fiduciary. Nevertheless, it is suggested that this is unlikely and would be an unfortunate step to 
take. The principal has the best claim to the bribe:154 the fiduciary should not have accepted 
the bribe, and could only do so in his or her position as a fiduciary, with a concomitant duty to 
account for that bribe to the principal.155 Although this might be thought to give a windfall to 
the principal, the principal is at least untainted by any illegality, unlike the fiduciary or briber. 
Both the briber and bribee have acted so unmeritoriously that neither deserves to “trump” the 
innocent principal. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
  
Patel v Mirza will undoubtedly have an impact upon the law of trusts. It is likely that the role 
of illegality in the law of trusts will be greatly reduced (from an already low level), and will 
only affect the outcome of a dispute where the illegality involved is particularly serious. This 
may further weaken any calls for section 199 of the Equality Act to be brought into force. Yet 
many issues remain to be resolved, and these could be important. As Lord Sumption remarked, 
‘We would be doing no service to the coherent development of the law if we simply substituted 
a new mess for the old one’.156 It is to be hoped that Patel v Mirza will not give rise to a mess, 
but promote fair and transparent reasoning to achieve sensible results. 
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